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ABSTRACT: 
 
Say What You Want, Get What You Need: 
The Effects of Media Freedom on FDI Inflows 
 
As the discussion concerning economic growth has become increasingly important, 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and its determinants have become a hot topic. This thesis 
uses 2SLS to investigate the relationship between Media Freedom, Socio-political 
Stability, and FDI levels, using Corruption as a robustness check. It finds that there is a 
positive correlation for FDI levels for both Media Freedom and Corruption, providing a 
theoretical framework within which they operate. 
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 Chapter I: Introduction 
 There is an old adage that states, “The squeaky wheel gets the grease.” A recent 
study on how press freedom affects domestic levels of investment seems to reinforce this 
phrase (Pal, Dutta, and Roy. 2011). The objective of this thesis is to take the research and 
models of this previous research and reconfigure it in order to measure Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). Formally speaking, FDI is investment from one country into another 
(normally by companies rather than governments) that involves establishing operations or 
acquiring tangible assets, including stakes in other businesses. 
 FDI is important because it serves as a strong indicator for economic growth, 
particularly in developing countries. As a nation collects FDI, it is better able to learn 
from make use of the technology that the investor brings to the host nation. This increase 
in technology leads to increased abilities to produce, thus stimulating economic growth. 
However, it is difficult to quantify exactly what stimulates FDI inflows, leading to 
much debate as to what actually fosters FDI in a particular country. This paper 
contributes to the academic literature on FDI by using quantitative statistical analysis in 
order to investigate how levels of media freedom may have an effect on levels of FDI 
inflow, which, at the time of this writing, had yet to be formally investigated. 
 Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 2-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
techniques to test null hypotheses, this thesis determines that there is a statistically 
significant relationship supporting the hypothesis that higher levels of media freedom 
encourage FDI inflows through a domino-effect relationship. In this relationship, higher 
levels of media freedom provide for a more stable political environment, which is crucial 
for encouraging FDI because financial markets are forward looking and depend on 
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 stability to make accurate predictions. This thesis successfully tests this relationship and 
also discovers a remarkably similar relationship shared between FDI, stability, and levels 
of perceived corruption. Following this statistical analysis, this thesis concludes with 
policy recommendations and suggestions for future research. 
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 Chapter II: Literature Review 
  In their 2011 paper “Media Freedom, Socio-Political Stability and 
Investment,” Sudeshna Pal, Nabamita Dutta, and Sanjukta Roy discuss the role that press 
freedom plays in a nation's domestic investment. Much of the research within this thesis 
will draw from their previous work, but will be reapplied to foreign direct investment 
(FDI). 
 The research mentioned within this thesis contributes to the argument that higher 
levels of press freedom contribute positively to levels of political stability, and that these 
resulting levels of stability have a positive correlation with levels of FDI for developing 
countries. At this time, there is no prior research concerning media freedom and its 
effects on FDI flows. 
 
 Press Freedom and Stability 
 There is a wealth of literature discussing the ability of a free press to create 
political and social stability. This relationship exists through a variety of theoretical 
mechanisms with real world evidence. Pal, Dutta, and Roy (2011) give three possible 
mechanisms for how a free press can manifest itself in the political environment: 
 First, “non-captured” media (media not owned or otherwise controlled by the 
state) is less likely to contain falsified or manipulated information for the purpose of 
creating unrest that benefits those in power. A concrete example is post-independence 
India, in which “government controlled monopoly press by and large displayed anti-
Muslim prejudices and contributed a great deal to the nurturing of communal hatred“(Pal, 
Dutta, and Roy 2011: 5). 
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  A second mechanism through which the relationship between press freedom and 
socio-political stability may function is that a free media can close the information gap 
between governments and constituents, thus making the government more transparent 
and accountable and inhibiting the possibility of conflict stemming from ethnic, social, or 
religious tension. It does so by creating more mutual information between governments 
and their constituents, which typically have asymmetrical sets of information on a given 
topic. Post-independence India again provides a historical example when considering the 
responsiveness of state governments and their reactions to food shortages. States that had 
higher newspaper circulation, voter turnout, and literacy rates also possessed more 
responsive governments, controlling for the effect of wealth (Besley and Burgess, 2000). 
With respect to this theory of bridging the information gap, further research also shows 
that freedom of the press decreases corruption, improves civil rights (Djankov et al. 
2002). During the 1930s in the United States, government services spending (Strömer 
2004), all of which is correlated with higher levels of stability. 
 The final mechanism proposed is that media that is unrestrained is more able to 
create pressure on governments, both domestically and from abroad. An uncaptured 
media may be more able to spread news internationally. News that is spread outside of 
the host country could create external pressure on the government from foreign 
governments or non-government organizations. Leeson (2008) shows that high levels of 
media freedom strongly correlate to higher levels of political knowledge, political 
participation, and voter turnout. The implication is that a free press is more able to 
facilitate peaceful change using legal channels, rather than the need to resort to violence. 
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  Stability and FDI Inflows  
 In addition to literature concerning the link between freedom of the press and 
political stability, there also exists a substantial body of work documenting the 
correlation between political stability and FDI inflows. Intuition would lead us to believe 
that higher levels of instability would result in lower levels of investment, because 
investors are less able to predict the real costs and profits of investments. However, there 
is an existential difficulty in quantifying this phenomenon, in that political stability is a 
complex phenomenon, and that only portions of this effect can be reliably measured 
(Singh and Jun, 1995: 5). 
 As a result, much of the relevant research leading up to Sing and Jun's study has 
been contradictory. In his 1966 article “The Foreign Direct Investment Decision Process, 
“Arahoni determines that political stability in the host country is the second most 
important factor in whether or not to engage in direct investment abroad, second only to 
market potential. However, in a 1972 paper, Bennett and Green determine that political 
stability has an inconsequential effect on American FDI outflows. Even later, Lewis 
(1979) runs analyses with multiple proxies, receiving mixed results: “He found 'the 
absence of aggressive domestic behavior within the political system against groups or 
officeholders' to be a significant determinant of FDI for the current period, but not for a 
lagged period. Another variable, the legitimacy of the regime, was found to be significant 
for a lagged period but not significant for the current period“(Singh and Jun, 1995: 5). 
Further research into more specified topics reveals that FDI inflows are significantly 
affected by regular constitutional government changes, but not by internal armed attacks, 
levels of nationalism, or colonial affiliation (Root and Ahmed, 1979).  
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  In 1995, Harinder Singh and Kwan W. Jun published a policy research paper for 
the World Bank titled: Some New Evidence on the Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment in Developing Countries, in which they discussed the role of political stability 
in determining FDI levels. Acknowledging the structural difficulties of their analysis, 
they constructed a regression model utilizing a political risk index (PRI) compiled by 
Beri. In their analysis, they determined that PRI is significant at the 1% level, barring the 
inclusion of exports relative to GDP in the regression equation (Singh and Jun, 14-15). 
They reinforce their argument by testing one mechanism through which political 
instability may directly effect the ability of an investment to create returns: the number of 
days lost as a result of “industrial or civil strife.“Rerunning the regression with work days 
lost (WDL) replacing PRI, they found that WDL is also statistically significant (again, 
barring the inclusion of exports in the regression model), especially for countries with 
low levels of FDI (Singh and Jun, 16). 
  
Corruption as a Control Variable 
 In order to better confirm the ability of media freedom to affect stability and FDI, 
a robustness check is employed. This thesis utilizes corruption levels as its control, as the 
literature suggests that FDI has similar effects upon stability—and thus, FDI.  
 Corruption as an Informal Institution 
 There is a divergence within academic economic literature as to whether or not 
corruption is a negative or positive element in a society. In order to best analyze the 
effects of corruption, it needs to be placed within the framework of institutions. In their 
2014 paper “Political Corruption and Institutional Stability,” Hanne Fjelde and Håvard 
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 Hegre argue that corruption exists as an “informal institution.” Informal institutions are 
those that are “created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
channels.” In their 2004 paper “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A 
Research Agenda,” Gretchen Helmke Steven Levinsky cite a number of examples of 
corruption functioning as an informal institution: 
For decades, Mexican presidents were selected not according to rules in the 
Constitution, the electoral law, or party statutes, but rather via the dedazo (“big 
finger”)—an unwritten code that gave the sitting president the right to choose his 
successor, specified the candidate pool, and prohibited potential candidates from 
openly seeking the job. In Japan, the “strict but unwritten rules” of Amakudari 
(“descent from heaven”), through which retiring state bureaucrats are awarded top 
positions in private corporations, have survived decades of administrative reform. 
In Central Asia, clan-based norms have “become the rules of the game,” while the 
constitutional structures created after the collapse of the Soviet Union are 
“increasingly … inconsequential.” And in much of the developing and 
postcommunist world, patterns of clientelism, corruption, and patrimonialism 
coexist with (and often subvert) new democratic, market, and state institutions. 
 
Historical evidence such as these instances give credit to the notion that although 
informal, corruption operates with many qualities that define formal institutions: it affects 
the political and economic incentives of a community's individuals and it permeates itself 
through both administrative and structural changes in a political system. 
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  Corruption and Stability 
 There is considerable debate concerning the relationship between corruption and 
political stability. Although it would follow logically that any process that undermines 
the state's ability to function would negate its ability to maintain control, there are a 
number of theories and considerable evidence that betray this assumption. 
 One theory for how corruption can provide stability is that of “rentier states.” A 
common example of rentier states are small, oil-exporting Gulf nations in the Middle 
East. These nations export oil for revenue (or “rent”) and in turn use this in order to 
placate the population. Where much of contemporary socioeconomic theory states that as 
incomes increase, so does the level of democracy of political inclusion, rentier states are 
able to instead “buy off” their populations. Rentier states are still corrupt, because the 
majority of the wealth is absorbed by the state, but just enough wealth is transferred to 
the public in order to placate any desire for structural political or economic change. 
Because the level of living is already so high, there is no incentive to rebel against a 
government—regardless of how authoritarian it is—for an economic or political system 
in which an individual risks having a lower quality of life (Matthew Gray, 2011). 
 Another theory, referenced in Acemoglu and Robinson's Why Nations Fail, is that 
corruption exists as an extractive institution, an institution “designed to extract incomes 
and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset.” Although corruption 
certainly has the potential to reallocate actual dollar amounts, corruption also has the 
capacity to be politically extractive in that it takes political power and influence from 
one, generally large portion of society to another, generally smaller portion of society—
the “elites.” Even if there is widespread support from the public at large for a change in 
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 the political and economic systems that they are subject to, political corruption can 
subvert the political processes so that the desires of the public at large are never put into 
play on the political stage. 
 It is interesting to note that although this argument implies corruption increases 
stability, it does so by impeding the level of interaction between the public and policy 
makers—the exact opposite of one proposed media freedom mechanism. It is in fact 
counter -intuitive for an extractive, authoritative regime to be host to a free media. This is 
largely because a regime that is dependent upon the extraction of economic and political 
capital from the populace has a natural incentive to hide its actions and motives from the 
public eye. 
 Despite the historical and contemporary evidence that is available to support these 
theories, there is still much debate upon whether this relationship actually exists, and 
there is substantial literature to suggest that there are several factors that may influence 
this relationship (Fjelde and Hegre, 2014). In any case, this thesis finds that due to its 
similar mechanisms within the theoretical framework, corruption serves as a good control 
variable with which to compare the effect of press freedom.  
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 Chapter III: Methodology 
 Model Specification 
 This thesis will measure the relationship between press freedom and FDI by using 
a linear regression series with pooled OLS statistics. Because this relationship is being 
tested as a “domino” effect, a regression framework based on the dual-equation model 
used by Alesina and Perotti  (1994: 9) and Pal, Dutta, and Roy (2011: 9) is utilized. This 
original model is synthesized with other variables proposed by Singh and Jun (1995) in 
order to better fit with FDI rather than domestic investment. The result is a model that 
utilizes a 2-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regression method, as stated  
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡                   (1) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = ß1 + ß2𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + ß3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + ß4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡     (2) 
  
Within this framework, these equations are bivariate and simultaneous. Equation (1) 
measures the dependent variable: FDI inflows as a percentage of that nation's GDP. The 
primary independent variable of interest is Stability, an index on political stability. In 
addition, the equation contains the year and Controls, which consists of indicators the 
literature suggests also determine levels of FDI, each with their own coefficient. They 
include real GDP per capita, market size, income levels, the exchange rate, trade 
openness, export orientation, population growth rate, and education. 
 Equation (2) is constructed similarly, but instead with Stability as the dependent 
variable. Here, the primary independent variable is MediaF, an index that evaluates a 
nation's level of media and press freedom. Another important independent variable 
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 is %FDI, which is included in order to capture the joint determination between FDI and 
press freedom, as documented by Dutta and Roy (2009). Equation (2) again has a 
dependent variable Year, in addition to the aforementioned set of Controls variables, 
which is identical to the set of variables utilized in Equation (1). 
 In order to verify that this model is appropriate, this thesis employs a series of 
regressions in order to show that there is no direct effect of Press Freedom upon a 
country's FDI as a percentage of its GDP. These will also be run using a 1-period time 
lag, and are constructed in the following fashion: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = ß1 + ß2𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡−1) + ß3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡−1) + ß4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 + ß5𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡−1)      (3)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = ß1 + ß2𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡−1) + ß3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡−1) + ß4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 + ß5𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡−1)      (4) 
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 = ß1 + ß2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡−1) + ß3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡−1) + ß4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 + ß5𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡−1)      
(5) 
   
 By running these linear regressions, the correlations between the three variables 
of interest will be exposed. When running a regression on one variable (for example, 
Political Stability, as in Equation (5)), the other two variables (in Equation (5), past 
values of Media Freedom and the level of FDI) are included in order to account for their 
shared endogeneity. 
 As an additional test of this theory, this thesis conducts a robustness check by 
including corruption as an independent variable into the regressions  This is done by 
recreating the tests above with an included corruption variable (Corruption) in each 
equation and comparing its coefficient to that of each independent variable of interest. 
These modified regressions are denoted using a prime, so that referring to the variation of 
Equation (3) being used to check robustness appears as Equation (3)'. 
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 Data 
 The database for this thesis is composed from a variety of sources, including raw 
data and various indexes—all of which are publically available. This study encompasses 
195 countries during the period of 2005-2013, and contains over 77,000 individual points 
of data. Descriptions and sources for the data are as follows:  
 
Corruption– Data for corruption exist as an index that quantifies the percieved level of 
corruption within a country. provided by Transparency International. The 
data prior to 2012 uses a 1-10 scale, and a 1-100 scale from 2012 onwards, 
with higher values indicating lower levels of corruption. This thesis has 
adjusted all values to match the 1-10 scale used prior to 2012. The data for 
this index was obtained directly via e-mail from Transparency International. 
Education – Because education is difficult to quantify using a single statistic, this thesis 
uses an index developed by the United Nations Development Programme 
and currently hosted by the Human Development Reports. It is an index 
ranging from 0.0-1.0, where larger values indicate increased levels in 
education. It is calculated using “Mean Years of Schooling” and “Expected 
Years of Schooling. “ 
ExpOrient – This is a measure of exports as a percentage of a nation's total GDP. This 
thesis includes exports as a control variable because it is widely believed 
that open economies “encourage more confidence and foreign 
investment“(Singh and Jun, 1995: 9). This variable's data are available as an 
indicator from the World Bank database. 
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percFDI –  This variable is a measurement of the net inflows of the reporting economy 
from foreign investors, divided by GDP. This variable's data are available as 
an indicator from the World Bank database 
MediaF – This variable is an annually published index from Freedom House that 
measures press and media freedom in 197 countries and territories. The 
index quantifies the degree of print, broadcast, and internet freedom within a 
country, with a numerical value and a categorization of “Free,” “Partly 
Free,” and “Not Free.” The index runs between 1 and 100, with lower values 
indicating more press and media freedom. 
GDP –  This is an annual measure of a nation's Gross National Product, measured in 
current USD. This variable's data are available as an indicator from the 
World Bank database. 
GDPpc – This is an annual measure of a nation's Gross National Product, measured in 
current USD and divided by the nation's population. This variable's data are 
available as an indicator from the World Bank database. 
GNI – This is an annual measure of the sum of value added by all resident 
producers plus any product taxes not included in the valuation of output plus 
net receipts of primary income from abroad, measured in current USD. This 
variable is included as a proxy for the size of a nation's market. Prior 
research shows that this is a significant determinant of American FDI (Singh 
and Jun 1995).  This variable's data are available as an indicator from the 
World Bank database. 
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 GroPop – This variable measures the annual growth in a country's population from the 
previous year in terms of percentage change. Higher levels of expected 
population mean that a country hosts more possible laborers and hosts a 
potentially larger domestic market. This variable's data are available as an 
indicator from the World Bank database. 
PolStab –  As stated by the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
project, this variable measures “perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. “ It is 
constructed from the “Political Stability and Absence of Violence.” portion 
of the index, which has been developed and compiled by the World Bank 
Group annually from 1996 to 2014. 
Region Dummies –  In order to capture the effects of geography and the trends of each 
region, dummies were generated for each region. This paper uses a total of 
11 regional dummies: North America (NorthAmerica), Caribbean 
(Caribbean), Latin America (LatinAmerica), WesternEurope 
(WesternEurope), Eastern Europe (EasternEurope),  Central Asia 
(CentralAsia), East Asia (EastAsia), South Asia, (SouthAsia), Oceania 
(Oceania), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSAfrica). 
TradeOp – This is a measurement of the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of 
GDP, which we use as a proxy for the level of openness in an economy. 
This variable's data are available as an indicator from the World Bank 
database. 
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 Year – This serves simply as a dummy variable in order to determine the year of 
each data entry. In addition, this variable will also control for the year to 
year variations in FDI flows and capture natural fluctuations in the world 
business cycle. 
Xrate – This is a measure of the country's real exchange rate. This is included as a 
control variable due to exchange rate risk and its role in determining the 
value of possible profits and risks of prospective investments. The World 
Bank provides an index  in which a currency is weighed against a broad 
range of other currencies, with 2010 serving as a base year. 
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 Chapter IV: Analysis Results 
 Time-Lagged Regressions 
 In order to justify running the 2-Stage Least Squares Regression, it is important to 
first evaluate the relationships between media freedom, stability, and FDI using a series 
of linear regression models. The results of these regressions are shown on Tables 1-3. 
Because the United States and Canada are only two countries in the region, North 
America was chosen to serve as the control region, thus providing descriptive coefficients 
for the greatest number of available countries. In addition, the time period lag is 1 year 
due to constraints within the data. This thesis will look at each regression in the order of 
the directional relationship proposed in Chapter II. 
 Table 1* displays the regression results for Equation (3), in which Stability is 
regressed against FDI, Media Freedom, and the set of controls. When the ß-coefficients 
are analyzed, there is a statistically significant correlation between the lagged effect of 
Media Freedom and levels of stability. Because the Freedom House Index utilizes lower 
values in order to denote higher levels of media freedom, the fact that ß2 is negative 
supports the proposed directional relationship. The fact that ß3, in addition to being very 
small (-.001), is statistically insignificant (p = .661) further strengthens the directional 
theory, as it indicates that FDI levels may be exogenous within this framework. 
 The next step in the directional relationship is displayed by Table 2, which 
displays the regression of FDI levels against the other variables of interest, plus controls 
(Equation (4)). Again, the negative ß-value for Media Freedom indicates that higher 
1 Tables within this thesis will display only the variables being investigated plus any variables that are 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. For full tables and outputs, refer to the Appendix 
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 levels of freedom within  a media correlate with increased levels of FDI (-0.018), but this 
result is statistically insignificant, with a p-value of 0.669. This indicates that however 
Media Freedom may affect FDI, this is not a direct relationship. The positive ß-value for 
Stability suggests that there is a positively correlated relationship, but this is complicated 
by the high p-value (0.990). At first glance, this Media Freedom may affect FDI, this is 
not a direct relationship. The positive ß-value for Stability suggests that there is a 
positively correlated statistic discourages an interpretation in favor of the directional 
theory. However, it is important to note that correlation does not disprove the theory, and 
that further confirmation will come from the 2SLS regression. 
Table 1: Stability 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 11.604 23.272  .499 .618 
Media Freedom Index w/ 1-
period Lag 
-.013 .001 -.344 -9.761 .000 
PercFDI w/ 1-period lag -.001 .001 -.011 -.439 .661 
a. Dependent Variable: Stability 
 
Table 2: FDI 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 718.203 674.493  1.065 .287 
Media Freedom Index w/ 1-
period Lag 
-.018 .043 -.024 -.427 .669 
Adjusted Stability Index w/ 1-
period lag 
.014 1.108 .001 .013 .990 
a. Dependent Variable: PercFDI 
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 Table 3: Media Freedom 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -586.750 550.964  -1.065 .287 
PercFDI w/ 1-period lag -.008 .032 -.006 -.256 .798 
Adjusted Stability Index w/ 1-
period lag 
-9.430 .850 -.384 -11.098 .000 
South Asia Dummy .145 6.978 .000 .021 .983 
 
Table 3 displays not a direct relationship. The positive ß-value for Stability 
suggests that there is a positively correlated relationship, but this is complicated by the 
high p-value (0.990). At first glance, this Media Freedom may affect FDI, this is not a 
direct relationship. The positive ß-value for Stability suggests that there is a positively 
correlated statistic discourages an interpretation in favor of the directional theory. 
However, it is important to note that this correlation does not disprove the theory, and 
that further confirmation will come from the 2SLS regression. The small ß-coefficient for 
FDI (-0.008), coupled with a large p-value (0.798), indicate that the effect of FDI's past 
values, although conducive to a free media, are both small and statistically insignificant. 
This, coupled with the ß-coefficient for FDI in Table 1, support the notion that FDI is 
endogenous within the proposed statistical model. However, Table 3 also brings  a 
possible complication in the form of a feedback effect. The ß-coefficient (-9.430) and p-
value (0.000) for Stability imply that as stability increases, so does the level of Press 
Freedom. Simple regression alone makes it difficult to discern the direction of causality. 
This, in conjunction with the statistical insignificans of Press Freedom in Equation (3), 
justify the use of a 2SLS regression model, as it will aid in inferring the path of causality. 
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 The direct relationship between Media Freedom with a 1-period lag and FDI is 
visually displayed in Graph 1. The scatter plot illustrates that what direct relationship 
exists between the two variables is relatively weak. Similarly, Graph 2 visualizes the 
weak direct relationship present between FDI levels and 1-period lagged Political 
Stability. In both cases, there is a best fit line that is consistent with the theory; but it has 
a low slope, suggesting low levels of correlation, and the high level of variance 
surrounding it indicate signify the weak statistical significance of the correlation. 
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2-Stage Least Square Regression 
 The results from the 2SLS regression, simulating Equations (1) and (2), are 
displayed in Table 4. The output in Table 4 displays both stages of the 2SLS regression. 
In the first stage regression, stability is set as the dependent variable, with press freedom 
and the controls functioning as independent variables. The first stage regression indicates 
that there is a negative ß-coefficient that is strongly significant, with a p-value equal to 
0.000. With this evidence, the null hypothesis that the ß-coefficient for press freedom 
equals zero can be safely rejected at the 99%-confidence level. 
 Continuing to the second stage of the2SLS regression, the amount of FDI as a 
percentage of GDP is set as the dependent variable, with the stability statistic obtained in 
the first stage and the control variables set as the independent variables. The resulting ß-  
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 Table 4: 2SLS Model Output 
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 coefficient yields a positive correlation between stability that is again significantly 
significant at the 99%-confidence level (p = 0.000). With the two stages of the regression 
combined, there is overwhelmingly strong evidence that the effects of press freedom and 
stability follow the directional theory outlined in Chapter II. 
  
Robustness Check Against Corruption 
As mentioned in Chapter II, there is a likely possibility that Corruption plays a  
role in influencing all three variables of interest present within this thesis. The following 
regressions are identical to those run earlier, with two important distinctions: first, an 
index for Corruption is included in order to judge its effects against those found earlier. 
Second, because the corruption index runs from an approximately 0-10 scale, the 
Freedom House index has been rescaled from its original 0-100 by 0.1 in order to make 
direct comparison between the two variables easier to interpret at first glance.  
 
Table 5: Stability with Corruption 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 12.650 23.277  .543 .587 
PercFDI w/ 1-period lag -.001 .001 -.010 -.421 .674 
AdjMedia w/ 1-period lag -.100 .016 -.247 -6.114 .000 
Corruption Index w/ 1-period 
Lag 
.154 .021 .391 7.304 .000 
Caribbean Dummy .014 .392 .001 .036 .971 
a. Dependent Variable: PolStab 
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 The results of Equation (3)' are displayed in Table 5. The addition of Corruption 
as a control has a relatively small impact on the ß-coefficient of Media Freedom. What is 
more interesting is that Corruption itself has a positive, statistically significant correlation 
with Stability that is 50% stronger than that of Media Freedom. Table 6 shows nearly 
identicle trends as Table 2 did previously, with all relationships between variables of 
interest being statistically insignificant. The absence of a direct effect is what qualifies 
the use of the 2SLS model. 
Table 6: FDI with Corruption 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 874.995 725.813  1.206 .228 
Political Stability w/ 1-period 
Lag 
.202 1.237 .010 .163 .870 
AdjMediaF w/ 1-period lag -.253 .525 -.032 -.481 .631 
Corruption Index w/ 1-period 
Lag 
-.872 .687 -.114 -1.270 .205 
a. Dependent Variable: PercFDI 
 
Table 7: Media Freedom with Corruption 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -489.033 543.592  -.900 .369 
PercFDI w/ 1-period lag -.009 .030 -.007 -.308 .758 
Political Stability w/ 1-period 
Lag 
-5.474 .901 -.223 -6.074 .000 
Corruption Index w/ 1-period 
Lag 
-4.150 .490 -.428 -8.476 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: AdjMediaF 
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 Finally, Table 7 provides surprising data (ß-coefficient = -4.150, p-value = 0.000), 
which strongly indicates that higher levels of corruption may actually contribute to higher 
levels of press freedom. However, a comparison of the ß-coefficients indicates that 
although the introduction of the Corruption variable into the equation creates a ß-
coefficient in Equation (6)' nearly half of that in Equation (6), the effect of Corruption on 
levels of media freedom is not quite as strong as the effect of Stability.  
 Graphs 3 through 5 visually examine Corruption's interaction with three key variables. 
Graph 3 is similar to Graphs 1 and 2 before it, in that it shows little direct relationship 
between its two variables. Because there is little evidence of a strong direct relationship, 
the 2SLS method is again a justified as a test of exogineity. 
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 2-Stage Least Squares with Corruption Robustness Check 
 Despite the surprising data provided by the new regressions, it is important to note 
that this does not necessarily disprove the hypothesis of this paper. In fact, corruption 
could serve as a measuring stick with which to measure the strength of the Media 
Freedom-FDI relationship and the interactions associated with it, provided that corruption  
follows the domino effect-style pattern suggested in the literature. In order to check this, 
a 2SLS regression that includes corruption as an additional instrumental variable is 
utilized. The data ouptut that constitutes Table 8 again shows both stages of the 2SLS 
regression. In the first stage, both Corruption and Media Freedom have ß-coefficients that 
indicate a positive correlations with stability. The results are also statistitally significant 
p-values of 0.000, putting both of them into the 99%-confidence interval. Where in the 
lagged regressions, Corruption was 50% stronger than Media Freedom for predicting 
Stability, the effect is reversed in the 2SLS model. Unsurprisingly, Stability has a positive 
(ß-coefficient = .022) and statistically significant (p-value = 0.002) correlation with FDI 
levels. This enables a rejection of the null hypothesis ßkMedia Freedom = 0 and confirms 
strong statistical evidence that a domino-style relationship among Media Freedom, 
Stability, and FDI does in fact exist. In addition, this analysis revieals that there is indeed 
a positive effect of corruption on FDI levels and that this relationship mimics that of 
media freedom. 
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 Table 8: 2SLS Regression with Corruption 
 
 
- 26 - 
 
 Testing Corruption for a  Quadratic Relationship 
 One key theoretical difference between how media freedom and corruption may 
affect stability and FDI levels is that corruption may have a quadratic relationship with 
these variables, rather than linear. The idea for this is that in extractive regimes, 
corruption may serve as an informal institution that allows those outside of the „elite“ to 
tap into their resources. In essence, corruption would serve as a method of “greasing the 
wheels” of tight bureaucracy and allowing for more economic movement. Conversely, 
overly corrupt regimes create instability and deter FDI. This can be conceptualized as 
politicians accepting bribes without fulfilling their obligation of the exchange, or a host 
government nationalizing particular industries. This implies that there is a “Goldilocks 
zone” of corruption. The existence of such a zone can be tested with a quadratic 
regression model in which the square of corruption is added in order to create a quadratic 
curve to fit the data, rather than a straight line: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = ß1 + ß2𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + ß3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + ß4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + ß5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡2 +ß6𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡          (6) 
 Although the shape of the scatter plot in Graph 4 indicates that this quadratic 
relationship actually does exist, but the results of this regression are inconclusive (the full 
output is listed as a table in the Appendix). A quadratic regression for media freedom was 
not conducted because there is no theoretical or empirical research to suggest that 
additional media freedom would result in higher levels of long term instability. 
Therefore, this thesis assumes that the relationship is linear in nature. This assumption is 
further strengthened by Graph 5, which displays a relationship that displays both a 
relatively high correlation and a linear form. 
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 Chapter V: Conclusions 
 Summary of Findings 
 Building upon the foundation of previous related research and approximately 
77,000 points of data, this thesis has adequately analyzed the quantitative relationship 
between media freedom and levels of FDI. The statistical evidence provided by the 2SLS 
regression within this thesis suggests that there is an existing, actual relationship in which 
media freedom indirectly affects FDI through its own effect on levels of stability. During 
the process of robustness checks, a similar process was discovered in which corruption 
also affects FDI through an indirect stability relationship. However, the 2SLS regression 
indicates that this effect is weaker than that of media freedom. This thesis theorized that 
corruption could have shared a quadratic relationship with the other key variables, but 
further attempts to investigate this phenomenon were inconclusive. 
 
 Policy Recommendations 
 The findings of this thesis likely suggest to world leaders that there are two 
strategies for securing higher levels of FDI: one that involves fostering a free media 
culture (an “open” strategy), and another that relies on government control tight enough 
to be considered corrupt (a “closed” strategy). National leaders may be tempted to 
attempt combining these strategies for the stacked effect they could provide, but this does 
not make sense theoretically, as corrupt governments and free media cultures are in 
principle mutually exclusive. A leader at the head of a corrupt government will have a 
vested interest in controlling the media in order to preserve his or her own rule. Though it 
might not be a direct cause, any opening of the media would put the regime currently in 
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 power at risk because restrictive government regimes are often reliant upon 
misinformation and propaganda.  
 Perhaps the most iconic example of this phenomenon in recent history is the 
collapse of the Soviet Union shortly after the introduction of its Glasnost policy, which 
called for increased openness and transparency within the Soviet regime. This illustrates 
how any regime that attempts to open its media also invites political instability. Because 
both media freedom and corruption are dependent upon stability in order to secure more 
FDI, there is a serious possibility that even if a regime were able to balance between the 
two strategies, the avenue through which corruption and the media function, as well as 
the resulting FDI, would be removed.  
 Assuming that there is indeed a mutual exclusivity between a free media and 
corrupt levels of government control, this thesis can empirically recommend that world 
leaders pursue an open strategy of a free media due to evidence that it indeed has a 
stronger effect upon FDI inflows. In addition to the empirical data displayed in this 
thesis, outside evidence also indicates that nations following a “closed” strategy are not 
capable of sustaining long term rapid economic growth, which is often the larger goal 
being pursued by nations looking to increase their levels of FDI. Tight, restrictive 
regimes such as contemporary China are capable of astonishingly high rates of growth, 
sometimes reaching well into the double-digits. 
 However, these high levels of growth are not sustainable. When nations following 
a “closed” strategy experience these rates of growth, they invariably experience a steep 
decline before plateauing. At the time of writing (April 2015), China's latest economic 
report indicates a growth rate of 7%—only half of the 2007 growth rate. Before China, 
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 there was the Soviet Union, and before the Soviets, there was the decline of Imperial 
Spain after the British defeat of the Armada. This follows the theory proposed by Daron 
Acemoglu and James A. Robinson in their book Why Nations Fail, in which they make a 
strong case that the economic growth and development of a nation are highly dependent 
upon the level of inclusiveness in its institutions. Even without the consideration of FDI 
or economic growth, this thesis would still recommend the adoption of “open” strategies 
due to the economic externalities created, such as increased personal and economic 
freedom for individuals. A common recommendation among economists that this thesis 
will support is the increase in the level of education that is offered and obtained, as both 
Tables 3 and 7 indicate a strong, positive correlation between higher levels of education 
and increased media freedom. 
  
 Suggestions for Further Research 
 This thesis provides strong statistical evidence to support its theories. However, at 
the time of writing, this is only the first formal attempt to investigate the relationship 
between media freedom and FDI. As a foray into such new territory, this thesis naturally 
contains an inherent number of shortcomings. As such, there are many areas in which 
further research is necessary. This could come in the form of more extensive robustness 
checks. For example, a study that investigates how media freedom affects FDI inflows 
with respect to a nation's current level of economic development. 
 Further research could also be used to dig deeper into the relationships found 
within this thesis. Such research could involve deeper investigation as to whether media 
freedom or corruption has additional influence upon FDI inflow levels that exist outside 
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 of their direct influence on stability. These tests could be structured to assess whether or 
not a free media encourages FDI inflows because it can provide more accurate 
information on business and investment opportunities.  
 What could be very beneficial to this thesis would be further investigation into the 
relationship between corruption, and media freedom. The regression in Table 7 revealed 
that corruption shares a statistically significant positive relationship, but this thesis fails 
to find any theoretical or empirical research to support the data. Possible insight could 
come from the research of Fjelde and Hegre (2014). They describe the ways that regime 
types interact with levels corruption. Their research describes how corruption can 
actually serve as a stabilizing force in autocratic societies, where democratic societies 
tend to remove corruption systematically. By incorporating a version of their model into 
the theoretical framework, one could control for a variety of factors that may be 
endogenous to the model employed by this thesis. Quite simply, this is a large topic that 
offers much to be explored. 
 As with any quantitative investigation, further empirical research into this topic 
will benefit in the future from larger amounts of quantifiable data. One of the limits of 
this thesis is that it could only extend a span of 8 years due to data limitations. As indexes 
continue to be developed, the extensibility and robustness of research will become greater 
and more reliable. 
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 Appendix 
 
 
 
Table 1: Stability 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 11.604 23.272  .499 .618 
Media Freedom Index w/ 1-
period Lag 
-.013 .001 -.344 -9.761 .000 
PercFDI w/ 1-period lag -.001 .001 -.011 -.439 .661 
Export Orientation w/ 1-period 
lag 
-.014 .003 -.469 -4.214 .000 
GDP per capita w/ 1-period lag -3.614E-7 .000 -.008 -.121 .904 
GNI w/ 1-period lag 1.512E-5 .000 .262 3.314 .001 
Population Growth w/ 1-period 
lag 
-.065 .025 -.082 -2.619 .009 
Trade Openness w/ 1-period 
lag 
.012 .002 .688 6.703 .000 
Education w/ 1-period Lag .955 .274 .167 3.478 .001 
Exchange Rate Index w/ 1-
period Lag 
.008 .002 .096 3.832 .000 
Year -.005 .012 -.013 -.454 .650 
Caribbean Dummy .202 .292 .016 .693 .489 
LA Dummy -.135 .175 -.019 -.772 .440 
WE Dummy .084 .155 .014 .541 .588 
EE Dummy .295 .166 .045 1.780 .076 
CA Dummy -.264 .411 -.015 -.643 .520 
EA Dummy .627 .409 .036 1.532 .126 
South Asia Dummy -.537 .294 -.044 -1.824 .069 
Oceania Dummy .414 .092 .115 4.484 .000 
MENA Dummy -.034 .210 -.004 -.162 .871 
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy .237 .152 .040 1.561 .119 
a. Dependent Variable: Stability 
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Table 2: FDI 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 718.203 674.493  1.065 .287 
Media Freedom Index w/ 1-
period Lag 
-.018 .043 -.024 -.427 .669 
Adjusted Stability Index w/ 1-
period lag 
.014 1.108 .001 .013 .990 
Export Orientation w/ 1-period 
lag 
.143 .099 .248 1.446 .149 
GDP per capita w/ 1-period lag .000 .000 .564 5.466 .000 
GNI w/ 1-period lag -.001 .000 -.524 -4.387 .000 
Population Growth w/ 1-period 
lag 
-.231 .724 -.015 -.320 .749 
Trade Openness w/ 1-period 
lag 
.034 .052 .107 .663 .508 
Education w/ 1-period Lag -8.361 8.025 -.077 -1.042 .298 
Exchange Rate Index w/ 1-
period Lag 
.010 .063 .006 .164 .870 
Year -.355 .336 -.046 -1.057 .291 
Caribbean Dummy -.649 8.452 -.003 -.077 .939 
LA Dummy -2.229 5.061 -.016 -.440 .660 
WE Dummy .856 4.506 .007 .190 .849 
EE Dummy 1.793 4.815 .014 .372 .710 
CA Dummy 6.375 11.916 .019 .535 .593 
EA Dummy -1.379 11.869 -.004 -.116 .908 
South Asia Dummy -5.984 8.531 -.026 -.701 .483 
Oceania Dummy .400 2.712 .006 .147 .883 
MENA Dummy 5.041 6.101 .030 .826 .409 
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy -4.168 4.410 -.036 -.945 .345 
a. Dependent Variable: PercFDI 
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Table 3: Media Freedom 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -586.750 550.964  -1.065 .287 
PercFDI w/ 1-period lag -.008 .032 -.006 -.256 .798 
Adjusted Stability Index w/ 1-
period lag 
-9.430 .850 -.384 -11.098 .000 
Export Orientation w/ 1-period 
lag 
.360 .080 .484 4.514 .000 
GDP per capita w/ 1-period lag -.001 .000 -.700 -11.216 .000 
GNI w/ 1-period lag .001 .000 .520 6.959 .000 
Population Growth w/ 1-period 
lag 
.899 .590 .046 1.523 .128 
Trade Openness w/ 1-period 
lag 
-.135 .042 -.326 -3.206 .001 
Education w/ 1-period Lag -48.055 6.345 -.341 -7.573 .000 
Exchange Rate Index w/ 1-
period Lag 
.098 .052 .046 1.892 .059 
Year .345 .274 .035 1.256 .210 
Caribbean Dummy -14.501 6.888 -.048 -2.105 .036 
LA Dummy -7.177 4.127 -.041 -1.739 .083 
WE Dummy -4.189 3.682 -.028 -1.138 .256 
EE Dummy .451 3.896 .003 .116 .908 
CA Dummy 22.649 9.720 .053 2.330 .020 
EA Dummy 17.735 9.679 .042 1.832 .067 
South Asia Dummy .145 6.978 .000 .021 .983 
Oceania Dummy 1.752 2.216 .020 .790 .430 
MENA Dummy 6.682 4.979 .031 1.342 .180 
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy 2.390 3.604 .016 .663 .507 
a. Dependent Variable: MediaF 
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Table 5: Stability with Corruption 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 12.650 23.277  .543 .587 
PercFDI w/ 1-period lag -.001 .001 -.010 -.421 .674 
AdjMedia w/ 1-period lag -.100 .016 -.247 -6.114 .000 
Corruption Index w/ 1-period 
Lag 
.154 .021 .391 7.304 .000 
Export Orientation w/ 1-
period lag 
-.007 .003 -.248 -2.179 .030 
GDP per capita w/ 1-period 
lag 
-4.119E-6 .000 -.097 -1.383 .167 
GNI w/ 1-period lag 5.314E-6 .000 .093 1.144 .253 
Population Growth w/ 1-
period lag 
-.094 .025 -.120 -3.814 .000 
Trade Openness w/ 1-period 
lag 
.008 .002 .497 4.726 .000 
Education w/ 1-period Lag .443 .281 .078 1.580 .115 
Exchange Rate Index w/ 1-
period Lag 
.009 .002 .107 4.379 .000 
Year -.006 .012 -.014 -.514 .607 
Caribbean Dummy .014 .392 .001 .036 .971 
LA Dummy -.135 .174 -.019 -.775 .438 
WE Dummy -.042 .150 -.007 -.279 .780 
EE Dummy .208 .158 .032 1.312 .190 
CA Dummy -.115 .394 -.007 -.291 .771 
EA Dummy .471 .392 .028 1.200 .230 
South Asia Dummy -.687 .283 -.057 -2.432 .015 
Oceania Dummy .478 .105 .113 4.560 .000 
MENA Dummy -.120 .202 -.014 -.593 .554 
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy .296 .154 .047 1.926 .055 
a. Dependent Variable: PolStab 
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 Table 6: FDI with Corruption 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 874.995 725.813  1.206 .228 
Political Stability w/ 1-period 
Lag 
.202 1.237 .010 .163 .870 
AdjMediaF w/ 1-period lag -.253 .525 -.032 -.481 .631 
Corruption Index w/ 1-period 
Lag 
-.872 .687 -.114 -1.270 .205 
Export Orientation w/ 1-
period lag 
.161 .106 .277 1.514 .131 
GDP per capita w/ 1-period 
lag 
.001 .000 .614 5.603 .000 
GNI w/ 1-period lag -.001 .000 -.504 -3.928 .000 
Population Growth w/ 1-
period lag 
-.217 .774 -.014 -.281 .779 
Trade Openness w/ 1-period 
lag 
.025 .055 .079 .459 .647 
Education w/ 1-period Lag -6.016 8.768 -.054 -.686 .493 
Exchange Rate Index w/ 1-
period Lag 
.015 .068 .009 .221 .825 
Year -.433 .362 -.054 -1.196 .232 
Caribbean Dummy -2.050 12.229 -.006 -.168 .867 
LA Dummy -2.193 5.434 -.016 -.404 .687 
WE Dummy 1.529 4.683 .013 .326 .744 
EE Dummy 1.110 4.942 .009 .225 .822 
CA Dummy 5.649 12.298 .017 .459 .646 
EA Dummy -.994 12.245 -.003 -.081 .935 
South Asia Dummy -5.326 8.824 -.023 -.604 .546 
Oceania Dummy 1.501 3.317 .018 .453 .651 
MENA Dummy 5.307 6.305 .032 .842 .400 
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy -4.206 4.808 -.035 -.875 .382 
a. Dependent Variable: PercFDI 
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Table 7: Media Freedom with Corruption 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -489.033 543.592  -.900 .369 
PercFDI w/ 1-period lag -.009 .030 -.007 -.308 .758 
Political Stability w/ 1-period 
Lag 
-5.474 .901 -.223 -6.074 .000 
Corruption Index w/ 1-period 
Lag 
-4.150 .490 -.428 -8.476 .000 
Export Orientation w/ 1-
period lag 
.268 .079 .365 3.392 .001 
GDP per capita w/ 1-period 
lag 
-.001 .000 -.564 -8.984 .000 
GNI w/ 1-period lag .001 .000 .616 8.415 .000 
Population Growth w/ 1-
period lag 
1.748 .576 .091 3.036 .002 
Trade Openness w/ 1-period 
lag 
-.105 .041 -.256 -2.531 .012 
Education w/ 1-period Lag -37.092 6.392 -.265 -5.803 .000 
Exchange Rate Index w/ 1-
period Lag 
.086 .051 .040 1.696 .090 
Year .277 .271 .027 1.023 .307 
Caribbean Dummy -19.408 9.128 -.047 -2.126 .034 
LA Dummy -8.997 4.054 -.050 -2.219 .027 
WE Dummy -1.221 3.508 -.008 -.348 .728 
EE Dummy -2.073 3.702 -.013 -.560 .576 
CA Dummy 18.288 9.195 .044 1.989 .047 
EA Dummy 18.662 9.139 .045 2.042 .042 
South Asia Dummy 4.828 6.616 .016 .730 .466 
Oceania Dummy .858 2.484 .008 .345 .730 
MENA Dummy 7.792 4.709 .037 1.654 .099 
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy 1.240 3.602 .008 .344 .731 
a. Dependent Variable: AdjMediaF 
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